Beyond missiles: How Pyongyang is expanding its power through deals and deterrence

Welcome to Within The Frame, where we bring the most pressing issues across the globe into focus. I'm Kim Mok-yeon.

As North Korea accelerates both military and diplomatic maneuvers, signs of strategic recalibration are surfacing across the region.

Pyongyang has announced the construction of a third 5,000-ton destroyer, expanded uranium enrichment capacity, and deepened military-industrial cooperation with Russia — all while floating nuclear threats aimed at the U.S.-ROK-Japan alliance.

At the same time, Seoul appears to be rethinking its approach, suspending decades-long radio broadcasts to the North and even reviewing the possibility of individual tourism.

On Within The Frame tonight, we take a closer look at how these moves reshape not just the Peninsula but the broader security architecture in Northeast Asia.

For this, we invite Youngshik Bong, Research Fellow at the Yonsei University Institute for North Korean Studies. Welcome.

Also joining us is Brian Myers, Professor of International Studies at Dongseo University. Good to see you.

Let's begin with North Korea's naval announcement. On July 21st, Pyongyang declared plans to complete its third 5,000-ton "Choe Hyon-class" destroyer by October 10th, 2026, coinciding with Party Foundation Day.

How do you interpret the significance of the timing, and what does it signal about North Korea's broader maritime strategy?

Building on that, we know the second ship in this class ran aground during its launch in May — a high-profile embarrassment — but Kim Jong-un doubled down, promising two destroyers per year from 2025.

What does this insistence on naval expansion reveal about North Korea's military ambitions or internal messaging?

Meanwhile, this isn't the only military investment Pyongyang's doubling down on.

A recent KIDA report estimates North Korea could theoretically produce over 125 nuclear warheads annually by next year.

What are the implications for regional stability if the North continues to industrialize at this pace?

Adding to that, the same report notes the expansion of uranium enrichment facilities in Yongbyon and Kangson, potentially doubling production lines.

How does this impact diplomatic leverage for future arms control negotiations, and should Washington and Seoul now shift from denuclearization to containment?

Parallel to its military developments, North Korea appears to be diversifying its strategic lifelines — especially through deeper ties with Russia.

We're now seeing North Korean apples in Russian supermarkets, local brands filing trademarks, and a 100 million dollar bridge going up over the Tumen River.

How should we interpret this economic engagement?

In contrast, South Korea seems to be exploring its own form of engagement — with reports that the government is reviewing individual tourism to the North, a policy not seen since the early Moon administration.

How would you read into this efforts?

Following South Korea's full suspension of state-run radio broadcasts to the North — a policy in place since 1973 — North Korea has now responded by halting its own jamming signals across most frequencies as of July 22nd.

Given this unexpected move, should we interpret this pause in the decades-long broadcast battle as a de-escalation gesture or as a tactical silence before new messaging begins?

Meanwhile, we are seeing North Korea intensify its rhetoric against the U.S.-ROK-Japan alliance, calling it a "nuclear triangle" accelerating war.

Is this simply ideological noise, or do you see this as groundwork for potential provocations during upcoming trilateral drills in September?

Finally, South Korea just awarded 30-day leave and commendations to soldiers who helped guide a North Korean defector across the DMZ earlier this month.

Given this is the first such incident under the current administration, what message does it send domestically, and how might Pyongyang interpret it externally?