Discussion with experts on N. Korea's response to Freedom Shield, ties with Russia

Welcome to Within The Frame, where we bring the most up-to-date issues across the globe into focus, I'm Kim Mok-yeon.

The first South Korea–U.S. joint military drill under the Trump 2.0 administration, the Freedom Shield, wrapped on March 20th.

The 11-day exercise simulated threats from North Korea’s shifting strategy, growing ties with Russia, and modern warfare tactics like nuclear and drone attacks.

Pyongyang fired a surface-to-air missile and slammed the drills as a “provocative nuclear war rehearsal.”

At the same time, back-to-back high-level visits between North Korea and Russia hint at deepening military cooperation—including arms exports and possible troop deployments.

With Washington showing signs of distancing itself from Seoul, concerns are mounting over shifting alliances and what they mean for South Korea’s security.

For a deeper discussion on this, we invite Evans Revere, Former U.S. Acting Assistant Secretary of State and Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings. Welcome.

Also joining us is Park Won-gon, Professor of North Korea Studies at Ewha Womans University. Great to see you.

1.(Revere) Let's start with Mr. Revere, so the Freedom Shield exercises concluded a few days ago.

North Korea reacted sharply at the start of the drills, launching several short-range ballistic missiles, but it later shifted to verbal criticism and refrained from launching stronger military provocations during the remainder of the exercise.

Why did North Korea, which had warned of high-intensity provocations, opt for restraint?

2.(Park) But on March 21st, the day after Freedom Shield ended, North Korea announced it had successfully test-fired its latest surface-to-air missile.

There is speculation that this test may have been aimed at verifying the performance of missiles intended for export to Russia.

Prof. Park, do you think this could be considered as evidence of military-technical cooperation between North Korea and Russia?

3.(Revere) Now, let's delve deeper into North Korea's ties with Russia.

On the same day, Secretary of the Russian Security Council Sergei Shoigu visited North Korea for a two-day trip.

Mr. Revere, who is Shoigu? And why is his visit significant, considering past precedents?

4.(Park) Shoigu’s visit to North Korea came right after Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko’s visit in mid-March.

Given the timing and scheduling, some analysts see this as unusual. Prof. Park, how about you? What do you think is the background behind Shoigu’s visit?

5.(Revere) The two stated that they “confirmed complete agreement” on international affairs surrounding North Korea and Russia. What kind of discussions may have taken place between them, Mr. Revere?

6.(Park) There is speculation that Kim Jong-un and Secretary Shoigu may have discussed reciprocal compensation for the deployment of North Korean troops. Prof. Park, could Russia provide advanced military technologies such as ICBM reentry technology or military reconnaissance satellites in exchange for troop deployments?

7.(Revere) It is reported that Shoigu delivered a personal letter from President Putin to Chairman Kim Jong-un. Some also say that Kim may have been invited to 러시아 for Victory Day on May 9th. Though Russia has not made specific comments on this, how likely is a visit by Kim Jong-un to Russia, Mr. Revere?

8.(Park) Last week, North Korea sent government delegations on economy and health to Russia, indicating that bilateral cooperation is expanding across multiple areas. Prof. Park, as the peace negotiations in the Ukraine war seem to show progress, do you think the North Korea-Russia partnership will continue? And in the face of deepening North Korea-Russia ties, how should South Korea respond?

9.(Park) On a separate occasion, Tulsi Gabbard, Director of National Intelligence, stated at the Senate Intelligence Committee that “North Korea is ready to conduct additional nuclear tests at any time,” and assessed that “Chairman Kim Jong-un has no intention of giving up nuclear weapons through negotiations.”

Prof. Park, this perception is similar to that of the Biden administration. What impact might this have on U.S.-North Korea dialogue?

10.(Revere) Meanwhile, Tulsi Gabbard, Director of National Intelligence, who oversees U.S. intelligence agencies, recently visited four Asian countries — excluding South Korea. U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth is also reportedly excluding South Korea from his Indo-Pacific tour next week.

Should this be seen as a sign of “Korea Passing” becoming a reality? What measures should be taken?